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iv

CaseNo.20080558-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Robert Palmer,
Defendant/Petitioner.

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and its decision is reported as
State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, 189 P.3d 69 (Addendum A). This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2) (West 2004) set forth five variants of DUE.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6), a "conviction for a violation of Subsection
(2)" was a third degree felony if it occurred within ten years of two prior
convictions. After a jury convicted defendant of DUI, the trial court dismissed the
jury and determined that this was defendant's third offense in ten years. The trial
court accordingly increased defendant's sentence to a third degree felony.

Issue la: Did defendant have a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
determine whether he was a DUI recidivist, even though the United States Supreme
Court has specifically held that there is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
consider a recidivism enhancement?
Standard of Review. "The Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Federal
Constitution is a question of law that we review for correctness/' State v. Davis,
972 P.2d 388,390 (Utah 1998).
Issue lb: If the Sixth Amendment analysis depends on whether a particular
statute is an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, did Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) set forth elements of DUI, even though the statute repeatedly
stated that a "conviction" occurred under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)?
Standard of Review. Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness. State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, \ 5,150 P.3d 540.
Issue 2: If the trial court erred by not submitting the recidivism enhancement
to the jury, was the error a structural error under the Utah Constitution?
Standard of Review. Defendant did not raise this issue below, so no standard of
review applies.

2

CONSTTTUIIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (West 2004) (Addendum B).1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND THE CASE
Underlying Facts2
On September 23,2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the Utah County
Sheriffs Office observed defendant pull out of the Flying J truck stop in Springville.
R. 104:14-15, Defendant failed to signal as he left the parking lot, and his car had
expired registration tags. R. 104:19.
After pulling defendant over, Sergeant Alexanderson noticed a 'Very strong"
odor of alcohol. R. 104: 19-20. Defendant had "an extremely difficult time"
complying with Sergeant Alexanderson's requests for a driver's license and
insurance. R. 104:21. Defendant was "quite disheveled," his "face was flushed," his
"hair was unkempt," he was sweating, "his speech was slurred" with a "thick
tongue sort of speech," and he "had a hard time answering questions in more than
1

Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (West 2004) was renumbered by the 2005
Legislature, but the crime at issue here occurred prior the 2005 amendment. Unless
otherwise indicated, all citations to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 are to the 2004
statute.
2

"In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we resolve all conflicts
and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court." State v.
Babbell, 770 P.2d 987,988 (Utah 1989).

3

one or two words." R. 104:23. When Sergeant Alexanderson asked defendant to
exit his vehicle, defendant had difficulty doing so. R. 104:50. Defendant then failed
a number of field sobriety tests. R. 104: 56-63. Officers searched defendant's car
and found two open, "larger" bottles of alcohol. R. 104: 24.
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence. R. 104: 66. After
being taken to jail, defendant took a breathalyzer test. Defendant's blood alcohol
was measured at .318, nearly four times the legal limit. R. 104: 66.
Charge and Trial
Defendant was charged with one count of driving under the influence of
alcohol, a violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (West 2004). R. 1. After
defendant did not appear for his trial, he was convicted by a jury in absentia. R. 75,
77.
Pursuant to an agreement with both parties, R. 105: 6-7, the trial court then
dismissed the jury and held a hearing to determine whether the recidivism
enhancement set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (a) applied to defendant.
R. 104:115-121. During that hearing, the State submitted documents showing that
defendant had two prior DUI convictions within the previous ten years. R. 104:116;
141 (Exhibits 2 & 3). Defense counsel did not object to these documents, but instead

4

simply argued that one of the convictions was more than ten years old. R. 104:11521. 3
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial prior to sentencing, arguing that he
had a federal constitutional right to have a jury consider the question of whether he
had two prior DUI convictions. R. 105: 3~8.4 Following argument, the trial court
concluded that defendant did have a constitutional right to have a jury decide the
recidivism enhancement question. R. 105: 9-12. But the court also held that the
failure to submit this question to the jury was harmless because defendant had not
successfully challenged the validity of his prior convictions. R. 105: 9-11.
Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the trial court's conclusion that
defendant had a federal constitutional right to have a jury consider the recidivism
enhancement. The court of appeals first held that while a defendant is entitled to
have a jury consider the elements of a crime and any non-recidivist sentencing
enhancements, recidivist sentencing enhancements maybe considered bytinejudge

3

The trial court never issued a written ruling on the claim, but appears to
have rejected it at sentencing. R. 105:10-11. Defendant has not renewed that claim
on appeal.
4

The record does not contain a written motion, so it appears that the motion
was made orally.
5

alone. State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, f f 4-10, 189 P.3d 69. The court then
concluded that because § 41-6-44(6) (a) set forth a sentencing enhancement, rather
than an element of the crime, defendant did not have a constitutional right to have
this question submitted to a jury. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206, I f 11-22.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant claims that the recidivism provision in Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004) set forth additional elements of DUI, and that he
therefore had a Sixth Amendment right to have the provision submitted to a jury.
Defendant is incorrect for two reasons.
First, regardless of whether the recidivism provision was an elements
provision or a sentencing enhancement, defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment
right to have a jury consider it.

Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth

Amendment does not treat elements provisions and sentencing enhancements
differently. Instead, both provisions are treated the same for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment. Moreover, while a defendant does have a Sixth Amendment right to
have a jury consider any statutory provision that increases the penalty range, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that recidivism enhancements are an exception
to that rule. Thus, defendant did not have a constitutional right to have a jury
consider the recidivism provision at issue in this case.
6

Second, even if the Sixth Amendment analysis depends on whether a statute
was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement, defendant's claim still fails
because Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement.
Although the statute repeatedly said that a defendant was "convicted" of DUI
under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2), the statute never said that a person could
also be "convicted" of DUI under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6). In addition,
while the 2004 Legislature created two variants of DUI that required the State to
prove that a defendant was a recidivist, the Legislature retained other variants that
did not require proof of recidivism. In this case, defendant was only charged under
the variants that did not include recidivism as an element. Finally, defendant has
not pointed to any legislative history that supports his claim that the Legislature
intended Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) to be an elements provision, rather than
a sentencing enhancement.
Point II: Defendant also claims that the failure to submit the recidivism
question to the jury was a structural error under the Utah Constitution, and that it
therefore was not subject to harmless error review. But defendant did not invoke
the Utah Constitution in any proceeding below. Instead, defendant only sought
relief under the United States Constitution. Defendant's argument is therefore
unpreserved, and it should be rejected on that basis.
7

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO HAVE A JURY DETERMINE WHETHER THIS WAS HIS
THIRD CONVICTION IN TEN YEARS
Defendant argues that the recidivism provision set forth in Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004) was an elements provision, not a sentencing
enhancement, and that he therefore had a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
consider whether the provision applied to his case. Pet. Br. 6-19.5
Defendant is incorrect for two reasons. First, regardless of whether the
recidivism provision was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement,
defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to have a jury consider it. Second,
even if the Constitution does treat elements provisions differently than sentencing
enhancements, defendant's claim still fails because the recidivism provision at issue
here was a sentencing enhancement. 6
5

Although this appeal focuses on the 2004 version of the DUI statute, that
statute was amended and renumbered in 2005, and it is therefore no longer in effect.
Compare Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2) to -(6) (West 2004) with Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6a-502 to -503 (West Supp. 2008).
6

In his brief, defendant repeatedly states that he was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial. See Pet. Br. 6,8,9,10,17,19. When discussing this
Court's decision in State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), however, defendant also
claims that he was denied his jury trial right under "Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of
the Utah Constitution." Pet. Br. 16.
8

A. The Sixth Amendment does not require that a jury consider a
recidivism enhancement
1. Contrary to defendant's claim, the Sixth Amendment does not
treat elements differently than sentencing enhancements.
In his brief, defendant first suggests that this case turns on whether the
recidivism provision set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was an elements
provision or a sentencing enhancement. Pet. Br. 6-10. Defendant is incorrect
Courts have traditionally drawn a distinction between elements and
sentencing enhancements. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224,
239-47 (1998); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477U.S. 79,86-87 (1986). In Apprendi v. New
Jersey, however, the United States Supreme Court abandoned this distinction for
purposes of the Sixth Amendment. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494
(2000). In Apprendi, the Court held that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right
to have the jury consider a hate crime enhancement because it "increase[d] the
Defendant did not rely on the state constitution below, but instead only
argued that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated. See, e.g., Aplt. Br. 7. In fact,
defendant did not even list the state constitution in his Table of Authorities. Aplt.
Br. at ii-iii.
The court of appeals concluded that defendant had "not provide[d] a separate
analysis based on the Utah Constitution/' State v. Palmer, 2008 UT App 206,17 n.4,
189 P.3d 69, and it accordingly limited its discussion to the federal constitution. Id.
at 117-22. This Court does not consider claims that were not properly presented to
the court of appeals. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, H 17-19,164 P.3d 397. This
Court should therefore limit its discussion of this issue to defendant's federal
constitutional claim.
9

prescribed range of penalties to which [the] defendant is exposed." Apprendi, 530
U.S. at 489. In so holding, the Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that the right
to a jury turns on whether a statute is an elements provision or a sentencing
enhancement. According to the Court, any "possible distinction between an
'element7 of a felony offense and a 'sentencing factor' was unknown... during the
years surrounding our Nation's founding." Id. at 478. Rather than continuing to
rely on the "constitutionally novel and elusive distinction between 'elements' and
'sentencing factors,'" the Court instead adopted a functional approach that looks to
the ultimate effect of the statutory provision. Id. at 494.
Under this approach, "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—
does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?" Id. If the answer is yes, a defendant has
the right to have a jury consider the provision; if the answer is no, no such right
exists, regardless of whether the provision was an elements provision or a
sentencing enhancement. Id.
Thus, "Apprendi repeatedly instructs... that the characterization of a fact or
circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the
question 'who decides,' judge or jury." King v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,604-05 (2002).
"Merely using the label 'sentence enhancement' to describe the [second act] surely
10

does not provide a principled basis for treating [the two acts] differently/7 Id. at
602.
Some courts have admittedly suggested that the distinction between elements
and sentencing enhancements retained some constitutional significance postApprendi. In Harris v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court resolved a postApprendi Sixth Amendment claim by determining that the provision at issue did not
set forth additional elements of the crime. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545,54969 (2002). In another opinion issued the same day, however, the Court suggested
that Harris was limited to the issue of mandatoiy-minimum sentences. Ring, 536 U.S.
at 605 n.5. Four years later, the Supreme Court removed any doubt by reiterating
fhat under Apprendi, "we have treated sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that
have to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Washington v.
Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 220 (2006). According to the Court, "[assigning this
distinction constitutional significance cannot be reconciled with our recognition in
Apprendi that elements and sentencing factors must be treated the same for Sixth
Amendment purposes/' Id. (emphasis added).
Given this, defendant's argument in this case is predicated on a false premise.
While defendant maintains that his Sixth Amendment claim depends on whether
the recidivism provision was an elements provision or a sentencing enhancement,
11

Apprendi and its progeny demonstrate that this is a distinction without anyconstitutional significance. Instead, regardless of whether the provision was an
element or a sentencing enhancement, "it must be treated the same for Sixth
Amendment purposes/ 7 Recuenco, 548 U.S. at 220.
2. There is no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury consider a
recidivism enhancement.
Given that elements and sentencing enhancements are treated the same under
the Sixth Amendment, the question in this case is what the Sixth Amendment
actually says about recidivism.
In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment juryright did not apply to a recidivist sentencing enhancement. Almendarez-Torres, 523
U.S. at 239-47. The Court focused on the fact that "the sentencing factor at issue
here—recidivism—is a traditional, if not the most traditional, basis for a sentencing
court's increasing an offender's sentence." Id. at 243. The Court also relied on the
'"distinct nature of the issue,'" and concluded that recidivism "'does not relate to the
commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment only.'" Id. at 243-44 (emphasis in
original) (citation omitted). Almendarez-Torres was decided pre-Apprendi, however,
and the Court accordingly focused its analysis on whether the provision was an
elements provision or a sentencing enhancement. Id.

12

Although Apprendi subsequently abandoned the distinction between
elements and sentencing enhancements, Apprendi did not abandon AlmendarezTorres' conclusion that recidivism enhancements do not need to be submitted to a
jury. Instead, Apprendi specifically held that even under the new analytical
framework, recidivism provisions do not have to be submitted to a jury under the
Sixth Amendment. The Court stated the Sixth Amendment rule as follows: "Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt/' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
The Court referred to this as a "narrow exception to the general rule/' and
explained that it was constitutionally permissible because prior convictions "'do[ ]
not relate to the commission of the offense/" Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490,496 (quoting
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244). According to the Court, "there is a vast
difference between accepting the validity of a prior judgment of conviction entered
in a proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and allowing the
judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard of proof." Id. at 496.
The Court has not abandoned the recidivism exception in subsequent cases.
In Cunningham v. California, for example, the Court reaffirmed "Apprendi's bright13

line rule: Except for a prior conviction, 'any fact that increases the penalty for a
crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt/" Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270,288-89
(2007) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). The "Federal Constitution's jury-trial
guarantee" therefore "proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose
a sentence... based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or
admitted by the defendant" Id. at 274-75.
While defendant claims that this case turns on whether the recidivism
provision was an element or a sentencing enhancement, that distinction is no longer
meaningful under Apprendi. Although the Sixth Amendment does require jury
consideration of all statutory provisions that increase a sentence beyond the
statutory range, Apprendi and its progeny have specifically held that recidivism
provisions are an exception to that rule. Under those cases, defendant did not have a
Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether he was a recidivist.
Defendant's claim should accordingly be rejected on this basis alone.

14

B. The recidivism enhancement set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 416-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
In any event, even if there were a constitutional distinction between elements
and sentencing enhancements, defendant's claim would still fail. Defendant claims
that "a review of the plain language, structure, and history of the statute shows that
the Legislature intended Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6)(a) to be elements of the
DUI third degree felony offense." Pet. Br. 11. Defendant is incorrect on all three
fronts. In addition, the fact that this was a recidivism enhancement also suggests
that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, rather than
an elements provision.
1. The statute's plain language shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
The "primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative
intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was
meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56,1 25,4 P.3d 795. This Court looks
"beyond the plain language only if [it] find[s] some ambiguity." Id. If there is no
ambiguity, the plain language controls. Id.
Subsection 41-6-44(2) set forth five variants of DUI. In the remaining
subsections of the statute, the Legislature repeatedly stated that a "conviction" for

15

DUI occurred under subsection (2), indicating a legislative intent that subsection (2)
set forth the elements of DUI. Specifically:
•

"A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsections
(2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(a)
(emphasis added).

•

"A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of... " Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(b) (emphasis added).

•

"A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty of
. . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(3)(c) (emphasis added).

•

"If a person is convicted under Subsection (2)... " Utah Code Ann. § 41-644(5)(a) (emphasis added).

•

"A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 41-644(6)(a) (emphasis added).

•

Setting forth certain penalties for "a person convicted for the first time under
Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(ll)(a)(i) (emphasis added).

•

Setting forth additional penalties for "a person convicted of any subsequent
offense under Subsection (2)// Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(11)(a)(ii)
(emphasis added).

•

"[A] court may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a
violation of Subsection (2)..." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(12)(a)(i) (emphasis
added).

•

Stating that the revocation period would "begin [on] the date on which the
individual would be eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for
a violation of Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(12)(a)(ii) (emphasis
added).

16

•

"If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)... / ' Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(15) (emphasis added).
Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a person was "convicted" of

DUI once § 41-6-44(2) was satisfied. By contrast, the statute never stated that a
person could be "convicted under Subsection (6)," nor did the statute ever state that
a person could be "convicted under Subsections (2) and (6)." In fact, § 41-6-44(6)(a)
itself stated that the enhanced penalties were appropriate when there had been a
"conviction for a violation of Subsection (2)."
Defendant is therefore incorrect when he claims that the court of appeals'
decision results in the "unintended consequence" of recidivism being treated as a
sentencing enhancement, rather than an element of the underlying crime. Pet. Br.
17-19. "The best evidence of the legislature's 'intent and purpose' is the plain
language of the statute. When analyzing statutory language, 'we presume that the
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its
ordinary and accepted meaning.'" State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, f 7,150 P.3d 532
(citation omitted). In this case, the Legislature repeatedly stated that the
"conviction" occurred when a defendant violated § 41-6-44(2). Had the Legislature
intended the recidivism provision in § 41-6-44(6) to be submitted to a jury, it could
have said that the State also had to satisfy § 41-6-44(6) in order to obtain a

17

"conviction." It did not. The plain language of the statute therefore supports the
conclusion that § 41-6-44(6) was a sentencing enhancement, not an elements
provision.
2. The statute's structure shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
As noted above, § 41-6-44(2) set forth five different variants of DUI. The first
three variants were set forth in § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii). These variants made it illegal
to drive with a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater, or instead when the influence of
alcohol "render[ed] the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii). The fourth and fifth variants were set forth in § 41-644(2)(a)(iv) and -(v). These variants only required a blood alcohol level of .05 or
greater, but were limited to cases in which the driver had a prior DUI conviction
within the previous ten years. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iv)-(v). The first
three variants did not have a recidivism requirement. Utah Code Ann. § 41-644(2)(a)(i)-(iii).
When interpreting statutes, "omissions in statutory language should *be taken
note of and given effect/" Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, 1999 UT110, \ 14,993
P.2d 875 (citation omitted). Here, the Legislature specifically required the State to
prove recidivism as an element under subsections (2)(a)(iv) and -(v), but it did not
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require any such showing under subsections (2)(a)(i) through -(iii). This clearly
suggests that the Legislature did not intend recidivism to be an element under the
first three variants of the crime.
3. The statute's legislative history shows that § 41-6-44(6) was a
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
Defendant also argues that Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44's legislative
history supports his claim. Defendant does not cite to any legislative history that is
contemporaneous to this particular statute, however, instead relying on this Court's
decision in State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (1953). Pet. Br. 13-17. But Harris does not
support defendant's claim.
Harris was tried and convicted under the 1953 version of the DUI statute.
Harris, 264 P.2d at 183-84. Like the 2004 statute, the 1953 DUI statute contained an
enhanced penalty for recidivist offenders. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(d) (1953)
(Addendum C). Before submitting the recidivism question to the jury, the trial court
in Harris told the jury that it did not see any evidence that the recidivism provision
had not been satisfied. Harris, 264 P.2d at 285. The jury therefore determined that
the recidivism provision had been satisfied. Id. On appeal, this Court reversed. It
noted that the State Constitution guarantees a defendant a right to have "all issues
of fact" submitted to a jury, and then concluded that the "prior conviction was a
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material element of the indictable misdemeanor with respect to which the defendant
was charged." Id. at 285-86.
By referring to "the indictable misdemeanor with respect to which the
defendant was charged," this Court tied its decision to the particular statute at issue.
Id. Contrary to defendant's assertion in this case, however, the 1953 statute is
different from the 2004 statute on at least three key levels.
First, the two statutes are temporally remote from each other. Not only is
there a 51-year gap between the two statutes, but the 2004 DUI statute is also 47
amendments removed from the 1953 statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44,
Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 551-52). Though a number of these
amendments occurred within a single legislative session, the statute was still
amended by 24 different legislatures during that 51-year period. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 551-52). In fact, in
the five years prior to defendant's crime, the statute was amended by the 1999
Legislature, the 2000 Legislature, the 2001 Legislature, the 2002 Legislature, and the
2004 Legislature. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004)
(Addendum B at 551-52).

Given these repeated alterations, this Court's

interpretation of the 1953 statute simply does not shed any light on the legislative
intent behind the 2004 statute.
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Second, defendant is incorrect when he claims that the "format" and
"language" regarding recidivism were never "significantly changed" in any of the
"forty plus amendments." Pet. Br. 15. In the 1953 statute, recidivism was discussed
in a single subsection: Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(d) (1953). In the 2004 statute,
recidivism was separately discussed in Subsections (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (8), and (11).
The 2004 statute treats recidivism in a substantially more intricate manner than the
1953 statute, and it therefore must be evaluated on its own terms.
Third, there was only one variant of DUI in the 1953 statute. See Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44(a) (1953) (making it illegal to drive while "under the influence
of intoxicating liquor"). The recidivism provision was then set forth in subsection
41-6-44(d), but the statute contained no language governing the interplay of these
two provisions. By contrast, the 2004 statute had five different variants of the crime,
two of which expressly included recidivism as an element of the crime, and three of
which did not. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i)-(iii) (West 2004) with Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(iv)-(v) (West 2004). The 2004 statute therefore expressly
separated recidivist DUI from non-recidivist DUI in a manner that was wholly
absent from the 1953 statute.
Moreover, the variants of the statute that included recidivism as an element
were added by the Legislature during the 2004 legislative session, and they were
21

made effective only three months prior to defendant's arrest. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44, Legislative History (West 2004) (Addendum B at 555-56). As noted by the
court of appeals, this supports the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
recidivism to be an element for the first three variants: "If the Utah Legislature
intended to preserve a right to jury trial for recidivism enhancements under
subsections (2)(a)(i) to (iii), it need only to have moved that subject into the
definition of the crime itself, as it did for subsections (2)(a)(iv) and (v)." Palmer, 2008
UTApp 206,^18.
But the Legislature did not include recidivism in the first three variants.
Significantly, defendant in this case was only charged and convicted under the nonrecidivist variants of the statute. R. 1,68. Defendant was not charged or convicted
under the variants that included recidivism as an element. R. 1,68.
In short, Harris interpreted a defunct statute that treated recidivism in a
substantially different manner than it was treated in the statute at issue here. Harris
does not shed any light on what the 2004 Legislature meant when it enacted this
particular statute.

22

L The statute's purpose suggests that § 41-6-44(6) was a
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
Finally, subsection 41-6-44(6)'s purpose also supports the view that this was a
sentencing enhancement, not an elements provision.
As noted by the Supreme Court, recidivism is "a traditional, if not the most
traditional, basis for a sentencing court's increasing an offender's sentence/'
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243.

Unlike elements provisions, recidivism

provisions "do[ ] not relate to the commission oi the offense, but got J to the
punishment only." Id. at 244 (quoting Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 629
(1912)) (emphasis in original). Thus, a trial court does not need to accept any new
fact that has not already been tested in the adversarial process when it applies a
recidivism provision. Instead, the trial court only needs to "accept[ ] the validity of
a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in which the defendant had
the right to a jury trial and the right to require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496.7
7

Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court's rulings "provide
little if any insight into the Utah Legislature's intent" regarding Utah Code
Annotated § 41-6-44(6) (West 2004). Pet. Br. 8. While the Supreme Court's
interpretations of federal statutes are not controlling, they do provide guidance
when Utah courts interpret similar state statutes. See Machan v. UNUM Life Ins. Co.
ofAmerica, 2005 UT 37,123,116 P.3d 342; Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, \ 11,997
P.2d 305; Forsberg v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2008 UT App 146,113,184 P.3d 610.
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Given this, there is a "distinctive significance [to] recidivism/' Jones v. United
States, 526 U.S. 227,249 (1999). The "basis for possible constitutional distinctiveness
is not hard to see: unlike virtually any other consideration used to enlarge the
possible penalty for an offense . . . a prior conviction must itself have been
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury
trial guarantees." Id. at 249.
Recidivism provisions therefore stand in stark contrast to other types of
enhancements that have been considered by Utah courts. In State v. Lopes, for
example, this Court held that a defendant has the right to have the so-called "gang
enhancement" submitted to a jury. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, I f 11-17,980 P.2d 191.
Unlike a gang enhancement, however, a recidivism enhancement does not focus on
the crime at issue. It does not look at what the defendant actually did, or who he
did it with, or what the results of the crime were. A recidivism enhancement does
not even look at the underlying crime, but instead only looks at other crimes that
were already proved under constitutional standards.
Thus, while there is but "one criminal act charged" in a gang enhancement
case, Lopes, 1999 UT 2 4 , f 1 2 , a recidivism enhancement only applies in cases in
which separate criminal charges have been adjudicated in separate criminal
proceedings. Insofar as these other charges have already been "entered in a
24

proceeding in which the defendant had the right to a jury trial and the right to
require the prosecutor to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt/' Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 496, legislatures have traditionally treated such provisions as sentencing
enhancements, rather than elements.

In Almendarez-Torres, for example, Ihe

Supreme Court stated that it could not find an instance in which Congress had
"made a defendant's recidivism an element of an offense where the conduct
proscribed is otherwise unlawful/' Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244. Other than
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)(iv)-(v), the State has not been able to locate an
instance in which the Utah Legislature has acted any differently.
In sum, the court of appeals' interpretation of this statute is consistent with
the statute's language, structure, history, and purpose. The court ot appeals'
decision should be affirmed.
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II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT PRESERVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE
ALLEGED ERROR WAS A STRUCTURAL ERROR UNDER THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION
Defendant also asks this Court to hold that the trial court's failure to submit
the recidivism question to a jury was a structural error under the Utah Constitution
that was not subject to harmless error review. Pet. Br. 19-23.
Defendant did not raise this claim at any point below. At the trial court,
defendant did not mention the Utah Constitution at any point, let alone develop a
state constitutional argument regarding harmless error review. R. 105:3-11. At the
court of appeals, defendants claim was exclusively predicated on federal law. In
his Argument heading, defendant claimed that he had been denied his "Sixth
Amendment right/' Aplt. Br. 7, and defendant then supported his argument by
relying on two federal decisions. Aplt. Br. 8-12. Though defendant parenthetically
referred to the Utah Constitution later in his brief, he did not ever develop any
argument based on it. In fact, defendant did not even cite to the Utah Constitution
in his Table of Authorities. Aplt. Br. ii-iii.

As noted by the court of appeals, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected
this argument under the federal constitution. See Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S.
212,218-22 (2006); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,7-15 (1999).
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In State v. Worwood, this Court held that the preservation rules apply to state
constitutional claims. State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, f 117-19,164 P.3d 397. "[I]n
keeping with our preservation policy, a state constitutional law argument must be
raised in the trial court, preserved through the appellate process, and adequately
briefed to us." Id. at % 18. Insofar as the defendant in Worwood had "failed to
advance a unique state constitutional analysis" at any stage below, this Court
"decline[d] to reach" his state constitutional claim for the first time on certiorari. Id.
at % 19. Defendant's state constitutional claim in this case is likewise unpreserved,
and it should be rejected on this basis.
In any event, the court of appeals did not reach this claim in its decision
below. Palmer, 2008 UTApp 206,122 n.16. If necessary, this Court should remand
to the court of appeals for consideration of this issue. See State v. King, 2006 UT 3,1
25,131 P.3d 202 ("Because the court of appeals did not consider this issue in the
proceedings below,... we decline to address it").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the court of appeals'
decision.
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McHUGH, Judge:
fl
Robert Palmer challenges his conviction under subsection
(2)(a) of Utah Code section 41-6-44, which makes it unlawful to
operate a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug (DUI) . See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (Supp. 2004) .x
Subsection (6)(a) of the same section declares that DUI is a
third degree felony if the defendant has two or more prior
convictions within the past ten years. See id. § 41-6-44(6) (a) ,
Palmer argues that subsection (6)(a) defines a separate crime,
rather than a sentence enhancement, and that the trial court

1. Utah Code section 41-6-44 was amended and renumbered in 2 0 05.
See Traffic Code Recodification and Revisions, ch. 2, §§ 58-59,
2005 Utah Laws 18, 56-60 (current version as amended at Utah Code
Ann. §§ 46-6a-502, -503 (Supp. 2007)); Alcohol Restricted
Drivers, ch. 91, §§ 1-2, 2005 Utah Laws 627, 627-28 (current
version at Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6a-502, -503 (Supp. 2007)).
Because Palmer's actions occurred prior to these revisions, we
cite to the 2004 code unless otherwise noted. See State v.
Gonzales, 2005 UT App 538, H 1 n.l, 127 P.3d 1252.

committed structural error when it found Palmer had two prior
convictions without submitting that question to the jury.
\2
We conclude that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement
provision, which merely increases the sentence for a recidivist.
Subsection (6)(a) does not define a separate crime and therefore
does not require a jury trial to establish prior convictions.
Accordingly, we affirm Palmer's felony DUI conviction.
BACKGROUND2
f3
On September 23, 2004, Sergeant George Alexanderson of the
Utah County Sheriff's Office pulled Palmer over for making an
illegal turn and driving a vehicle with an expired registration.
There was "a very strong [odor] of an alcoholic beverage" when
Sergeant Alexanderson approached Palmer. Additionally, Palmer
had "an extremely difficult time" producing his driver's license,
and "his speech was slurred" in a "thick tongue sort of" way.
Sergeant Alexanderson, assisted by backup officers, suspected
Palmer was intoxicated and administered three field sobriety
tests; Palmer failed all three. Accordingly, Palmer was arrested
for DUI. A subsequent breathalyzer test measured Palmer's blood
alcohol concentration at .318, nearly four times the legal limit
of .08, see icL § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i) , (iii) .
1(4
Palmer was charged by information on January 4, 2 005, with
one count of DUI. Palmer pleaded not guilty, and a jury trial
was scheduled for August 8, 2 006. Despite receiving notice of
the trial date, Palmer failed to appear and was convicted in
absentia of DUI. By stipulation of the parties, the jury was
excused, and the prosecution presented evidence of Palmer's prior
convictions to the trial judge, resulting in an increase in
Palmer's sentence.
i[5
At sentencing, Palmer argued his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial was violated when the trial judge, as opposed to the
jury, considered the sentence enhancement based on Palmer's prior
convictions.3 The trial court found Palmer's Sixth Amendment
2. "'In setting out the facts from the record on appeal, we
resolve all conflicts and doubts in favor of the jury's verdict
and the rulings of the trial court.'" State v. Yanez, 2002 UT
App 50, % 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (quoting State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d
422, 422-23 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)).
3. Palmer's argument before the trial judge was that "his right
to have the jury . . . consider the enhancement" was improperly
(continued...)
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rights were violated but denied Palmer's motion on the basis of
harmless error. The trial court sentenced Palmer to zero to five
years in the Utah State Prison, and Palmer filed this appeal.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
f6
Palmer presents one issue on appeal: "Whether the trial
court violated Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury
consider his prior DUI convictions . . . ." "Constitutional
issues are questions of law that we review for correctness."
State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 7, 139 P.3d 1066.
ANALYSIS
i|7
The right to a jury trial in criminal proceedings is secured
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 See
U.S. Const, amend. VI. That amendment declares: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . ."5 Id.
3 . (...continued)
waived. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the State suggests
Palmer's argument on appeal — that subsection (6) (a) is an
"element" and not merely an "enhancement"--is unpreserved. We
disagree. "The purpose of preserving the error is to assure that
the trial court has had the claimed error brought to its
attention in a timely fashion, allowing the trial court the first
opportunity to address and correct the problem." State v. Beck,
2007 UT 60, 1 8, 165 P.3d 1225. In this case, the trial court
addressed both enhancements and elements. Indeed, the trial
court cited to relevant authority and ultimately concluded that
subsection (6)(a) is "not just a sentencing enhancement" but
rather a new offense.
4. The right to a jury trial is also secured by Article I,
Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. However, Palmer does not
provide a separate analysis based on the Utah Constitution.
Indeed, Palmer's list of controlling statutes only contains the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. "Therefore,
we address only the federal provision." State v. Jensen, 818
P.2d 551, 552 n.2 (Utah 1991); see also State v. Worwood, 2007 UT
47, 1 18, 164 P.3d 397 ("[C]ursory references to the state
constitution within arguments otherwise dedicated to a federal
constitutional claim are inadequate.").
5.

The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was incorporated
(continued...)
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%8
The Sixth Amendment's provisions have been interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court as providing a criminal defendant
with "the right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable
doubt, his guilt of every element of the crime with which he is
charged." United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506,- 522-23 (1995)
(emphasis added). Accordingly, if Palmer is correct that
subsection 6(a) of Utah Code section 41-6-44 is intended as an
element of the crime of DUI, we assume without deciding that
Palmer had a constitutional right to have the jury determine
whether or not the State proved that element.
1(9
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressly ruled
that the Sixth Amendment does not require prior convictions to be
submitted to the jury when used merely as a sentence
enhancement.6 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476
(2000) ("[A]ny fact (other than prior conviction) that increases
5. (...continued)
through the Fourteenth Amendment and has been declared binding on
the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)
(fl[W]e hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of
jury trial in all criminal cases which--were they to be tried in
a federal court--would come within the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee.").
6. This is an exception to the more general rule that sentence
enhancements "must be . . . submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt" if they "increase[] the maximum
penalty for a crime." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476
(2000). Palmer suggests this exception stands on somewhat shaky
footing. See id. at 489 (suggesting the prior conviction
exception was incorrectly decided); Range1-Reyes v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 2873, 2874 (2006) (denying cert.) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (lf[I]t has long been clear that a majority of this
Court now rejects that exception."). But see id. (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("While I continue to believe that Almendarez-Torres
was wrongly decided, that is not a sufficient reason for
revisiting the issue. . . . The doctrine of stare decisis
provides sufficient basis for the denial of certiorari in these
cases." (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224
(1998))). At this time, the exception still stands and has
recently been reaffirmed. See Cunningham v. California, 127 S.
Ct. 856, 864, 869 (2007) ("Other than a prior conviction . . .
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime . . . must be
submitted to a jury . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted));
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005) (same). Unless
and until Almendarez-Torres is actually reversed, it is
controlling precedent on the scope of Palmer's Sixth Amendment
rights.
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the maximum penalty for a crime must be . . . submitted to a
jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." (emphasis added));
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998)
(ruling recidivism was not an element of a particular offense
and, therefore, need not be charged in an indictment or
determined by a jury). Accordingly, if the State is correct that
subsection 6(a) was intended as a sentence enhancement, relevant
only after a DUI conviction had been secured, Palmer did not have
a constitutional right to have the fact of his prior convictions
decided by a jury.
flO Because Palmer's constitutional argument hinges on the
classification of subsection 6(a) as either an element or a
sentence enhancement, Palmer correctly recognizes that "[tjhe
real issue before this Court is whether Utah Code Annotated § 416-44(6) (a) ([Supp. 2004]) provides separate elements . . . or
whether this [sub]section is only an enhancement provision."
" [T]he question of which factors are" elements and which factors
are sentence enhancements "is normally a matter for [the
legislative branch]." Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228.
We therefore look to the statute before us
and ask what [the legislature] intended. Did
it intend the . . . prior conviction[] to
help define a separate crime? Or did it
intend the presence of an earlier conviction
as a sentencing factor, a factor that a
sentencing court might use to increase
punishment? In answering this question, we
look to the statute's language, structure,
subject matter, context, and history--factors
that typically help courts determine a
statute's objectives and thereby illuminate
its text.
Id. (emphasis added).
til Our review of Utah Code section 41-6-44 convinces us that
the legislature did not intend subsection 6(a) to constitute a
separate DUI offense but, rather, a sentence enhancement used to
increase punishment for a recidivist.
i[l2 To begin with, subsection 6(a) 's subject matter is
indicative of its design as a sentence enhancement. The Supreme
Court interpreted a similar statutory provision in AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and emphasized that
"the relevant statutory subject matter is recidivism. That
subject matter--prior commission of a . . . crime--is as typical
a sentencing factor as one might imagine." Id. at 229-30.
Likewise, the Court acknowledged that "the introduction of
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evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant
prejudice." Id. at 235. Accordingly, the Court assumed that
"other things being equal, . . . Congress would [not] have wanted
to create this kind of unfairness[--introduction of evidence of
prior convictions during the guilt phase of the trial--]in
respect to facts that are almost never contested." Id. For
these reasons, the Supreme Court determined the statutory
provision at issue in Almendarez-Torres was a sentence
enhancement and not an element of the crime charged. See id. at
234-35, 243-44 (" [T]o hold that the Constitution requires that
recidivism be deemed an 'element1 of petitioner's offense would
mark an abrupt departure from a longstanding tradition of
treating recidivism as going to the punishment only." (additional
alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
1Jl3 Of course, the general indicators of legislative intent
recognized by the Supreme Court must give way if evidence
demonstrates that the Utah Legislature actually intended
subsection (6) (a) to define a separate DUI crime. See id. at
244. However, no such evidence exists. On the contrary,
subsection (6)(a)!s plain language demonstrates it was not
intended to define a separate crime but, rather, to operate as a
sentence enhancement. See generally In re Z.C., 2 007 UT 54, f 6,
165 P.3d 1206 ("The first step of statutory interpretation is to
evaluate the best evidence of legislative intent: the plain
language of the statute itself. When examining the statutory
language we must assume the legislature used each term advisedly
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
1Jl4 Under subsection 6 (a) , " fa] conviction for a violation of
Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is . . . a third or
subsequent conviction . . . within ten years." Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (6) (a) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added). Notably,
subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit or declare any activity
illegal. Compare id. § 41-6-44(2) ("A person may not . . . .
(emphasis added)), with id. § 41-6-44(6) ("A conviction for a
violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony . . . .
(emphasis added)). Instead, subsection (6)(a) indicates that a
defendant has been charged and convicted "for a violation of
Subsection (2)." Id. § 41-6-44 (6) (a) .
^[15 In this case, subsection (2) made it illegal for Palmer to
(1) operate a vehicle and (2) have a blood alcohol level above
.08. See id. § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (i), (iii) . Those were the only
elements necessary for Palmer's conviction.7 See State v. PerezAvlla, 2006 UT App 71, H 11, 131 P.3d 864 ("[T]hat the State show
7.

Palmer concedes that these elements were satisfied.
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that a defendant operated a vehicle with a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 or greater . . . . [are] the only
required showing[s] for DUI."). Subsection (6)(a) did not add to
those two elements in any way, and, in fact, contained an express
prerequisite before its provisions were applicable--" [a]
conviction for a violation of Subsection (2)." Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44(6)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, Palmer's previous
convictions were irrelevant to his guilt or innocence of the
crime charged--DUI. See id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (i), (iii) .
Accordingly, we hold subsection 6(a) does not define a new crime
but, rather, operates as a sentence enhancement after a
conviction under subsection (2) has been obtained. See
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244 ("[R]ecidivism does not relate
to the commission of the offense, but goes to the punishment
only, and therefore . . . . [need not] be deemed an 'element1 of
petitioner's offense . . . ." (internal quotation marks
omitted) ) .
fl6 Our ruling on this issue is further strengthened by the
structure of the statute, which evidences the legislature's
intent concerning when prior convictions should be considered
elements necessary for the crime of DUI. Subsection (2) defines
five different DUI offenses. For example, subsection (2)(a)(iii)
makes it illegal to drive a vehicle with a blood alcohol level
exceeding .08, regardless of whether the driver has prior DUI
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iii); see also
id. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i). However, subsection (2)(a)(v) imposes
stricter limits for individuals with prior convictions. See id.
§ 41-6-44(2)(a)(v). Subsection (2)(a)(v) makes it a crime to (1)
be twenty-one years or older; (2) have a blood alcohol level of
.05 or higher; (3) have a passenger under sixteen; and (4) have
"committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction."
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. § 41-6-44(2) (a) (iv) (creating
similar restrictions). Thus, under subsection (2)(a)(v), a prior
conviction is contained in the provision that defines the crime
charged. We are obligated to assume that the legislature's
decision to include prior convictions within subsection (2)(a)(v)
but not within subsection (2)(a)(iii) was deliberate. See Davis
County Solid Waste Meruit. v. City of Bountiful, 2002 UT 60, %% 1011, 52 P.3d 1174 (relying on a statute's structure when
interpreting its meaning).
fl7 Our ruling on this issue necessarily rejects Palmer's
argument that State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284
(1953), compels a different result. In Harris, a defendant's
prior DUI convictions were submitted to the jury and the trial
judge improperly commented on the evidence. See id. at 285-86.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction,
ruling: "[T]he right of an accused to trial by jury, assured by
the provisions of our State Constitution, means that all issues
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of fact shall be submitted to them and that the Court should
neither expressly nor by implication indicate his opinion upon
the facts or as to the weight of the evidence." Id. (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted). The court then noted that "[t]he
prior conviction was a material element of the" misdemeanor DUI
charge and remanded for a new trial without the judge's
impermissible comments. Id. at 286.
Il8 Harris is distinguishable from this case for several
reasons. First, Harris was decided under the Utah Constitution
and not under the United States Constitution. See generally Wood
v. University of Utah Med. Ctr., 2002 UT 134, 1 29, 67 P.3d 436
("We note that our state constitution may, under some
circumstances, provide greater protections for our citizens than
are required under the federal constitution."). 8 Second, Harris
was a correct statement of the law as it existed at that time.
The Utah Supreme Court decided Harris forty-five years before the
United States Supreme Court articulated the difference between
elements and enhancements, carving out an exception to the Sixth
Amendment for recidivism enhancements. See Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998) (ruling prior
convictions need not be submitted to jury when used as sentence
enhancements). 9 Third, the statute considered in Harris has been
amended more than forty times between 1953 and 2004. See Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 History notes. Those amendments include the
key language at issue in this case. See Amendments to Operating
Under the Influence, ch. 205, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (2) (a) (iv)-(v),
2004 Utah Laws 785, 786 (imposing additional limits on
individuals with prior convictions); Driving Under the Influence
Penalty Amendments, ch. 64, sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (6) (a), 2001 Utah
Laws 246, 247 (amending subsection (6)(a) to read: "A conviction
for a violation of subsection (2) is a third degree felony if
. . . . " ) ; Revisions to Driving Under the Influence, ch. 289,
sec. 1, § 41-6-44 (6) (a) , 2001 Utah Laws 1349, 1350 (same, but
8. Palmer has neither cited the Utah Constitution nor argued a
broader protection here.
9. The Supreme Court not only carved out the exception for
recidivism, but also suggested that recidivism will generally be
treated as a sentence enhancement. See Almendarez-Torres v.
United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230, 234-35, 243-44 (1998) ("[T]o
hold that the Constitution requires that recidivism be deemed an
element of petitioner's offense would mark an abrupt departure
from a longstanding tradition of treating recidivism as going to
the punishment only." (alteration and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488, 496 (2000)
(" [R]ecidivism does not relate to the commission of the offense."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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extending the relevant time period). Further, these amendments
came after the United States Supreme Court opinions
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, see, e.g.,
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35, and presumably were made
with knowledge of that authority, see Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507
U.S. 511, 516 (1993) (assuming Congress was familiar with prior
judicial opinions); McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 140 (1991)
("We certainly presume that . . . when Congress selected this
language, our elected representatives were familiar with our
recently announced opinions . . . . " ) ; Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT
29, % 39, 158 P.3d 532 ("We presume the Legislature is aware of
our case law . . . . " ) .
If the Utah Legislature intended to
preserve a right to jury trial for recidivism enhancements under
subsections (2)(a)(i) to (iii), it need only to have moved that
subject into the definition of the crime itself, as it did for
subsections (2)(a)(iv) and (v).
fl9 Moreover, recent decisions from our appellate courts have
routinely referred to subsection 6(a) as an "enhancement
provision."10 See, e.g.. State v. Garcia, 696 P.2d 1209, 1209
(Utah 1985) (mem.) (per curiam) ("Defendant was convicted . . .
of FDUI1. She was sentenced . . . under the enhancement
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44(d)." (emphasis added));
State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, % 23, 143 P.3d 302 ("[W]e
reverse only the enhancement of [the defendant's] DUI offense,
and not the underlying DUI conviction itself . . . ." (emphasis
added)), cert, dismissed. No. 20060817, 2007 Utah Lexis 234 (July
25, 2007); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, 81 P.3d 775
(repeatedly referring to defendant's felony DUI conviction as an
enhancement or enhanced penalty obtained under the "enhancement
provision"); State v. Soto, 2006 UT App 122U, para. 4 (mem.) (per
curiam) ("[S]ection 41-6-44 (6) (a), by its clear terms, permits
enhancement based on a [prior] DUI . . . ." (emphasis added));
State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 431U, para. 4 (mem.) (per curiam)
("[T]he DUI statute unambiguously enhances a third conviction to
a third degree felony . . . ." (emphasis added)); State v.
Hawley, 2001 UT App 284U, para. 5 (mem.) ("[T]he DUI conviction
was properly enhanced to a third degree felony." (emphasis

10. Palmer's own arguments appear to recognize subsection 6(a)'s
role as an enhancement provision. Palmer's argument to the trial
court was that "his right to have the jury . . . consider the
enhancement" was improperly waived. Likewise, Palmer identified
the issue on appeal as, "Whether the trial court violated
Palmer's constitutional right to have a jury consider his prior
DUI convictions for enhancement purposes . . . ." (Emphasis
added.)
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added)). 11 Unlike other enhancement factors, see, e.g., Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A)-(C) (Supp. 2004), there is no
federal constitutional right to a jury trial for "recidivist
enhancements. "12
K20 Finally, we reject the dissent f s argument that subsection
6(a) should not be read as a sentence enhancement because the
increase from a class B misdemeanor to a third degree felony is
dramatic and subjects the defendant to "serious collateral
effects." See infra % 31. While we agree that there are
significant collateral consequences to the elevation of a charge
from misdemeanor to felony, we do not agree that these
consequences invalidate the holdings of Apprendi and AlmendarezTorres. Indeed, virtually all of the other jurisdictions that
have addressed this issue have rejected that proposition. See,
e.g., Tallev v. State, No. 172, 2003 Del. Lexis 643, at *5 (Dec.
29, 2003) (rejecting argument that prior DUI convictions were
elements because they increased sentence from a misdemeanor to a
felony); People v. Braman, 765 N.E.2d 500, 502-04 (111. App. Ct.
2002) (affirming trial court's enhancement of DUI conviction from
11. The dissent argues Harris "has not been altered,
distinguished, or reversed," see infra \ 28, and that "no other
case has contradicted" its holding that "prior convictions are to
be treated as an element," see infra \ 30. However, these cases
state that subsection (6)(a) is an enhancement provision. The
explicit language of these rulings, in light of the post-Harris
precedent of the United States Supreme Court clearly
distinguishing between elements and enhancements, convinces us
that Harris has at least been put into question. See, e.g.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000); AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 229-35 (1998) . Moreover,
in the more than fifty years since Harris was decided, neither
Utah appellate court has relied on Harris for the proposition the
dissent suggests.
12. Regardless of whether the factors contained in section 41-644(3)(a)(ii)(A)-(C) are deemed elements, as argued by the
dissent, or enhancements that increase the maximum penalty, as we
hold, these factors must be submitted to the jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 53 0 U.S. at 476. In
contrast, recidivist enhancements stand on a unique legal footing
that allows the trial judge to determine if the defendant is a
repeat offender. Consequently, the designation of a factor as an
enhancement or an element will determine whether that fact must
be proved to obtain a conviction, or merely to enhance the
punishment after conviction. Designation as an enhancement will
not, however, definitively answer the question of whether the
jury must decide whether that fact has been proved.

20060925-CA

10

misdemeanor to felony even though defendant's prior convictions
were not submitted to the jury); State v. Kendall, 58 P.3d 660,
6 67-68 (Kan. 2 002) (rejecting argument that defendant's "two
prior DUT convictions must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt before that fact can be used to change the
classification of [the defendant's] crime from a misdemeanor to a
felony"); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Mo. 2005) (holding
DUI enhancement from a misdemeanor to a felony based on a prior
conviction did not constitute a new offense); State v. Lebaron,
808 A.2d 541, 543-45 (N.H. 2002) (holding prior convictions "need
not hav'e been . . . proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt"
even though they increased defendant's sentence from a
misdemeanor to a felony) . But see United States v. RodriguezGonzales, 358 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) ("The existence of
a prior conviction . . . substantively transforms a second
conviction under the statute from a misdemeanor to a felony. A
prior conviction is therefore more than a sentencing factor
.") . 1 3

f21 In addition, the dissent's argument ignores the "serious
collateral effects" of confinement in prison. In AlmendarezTorres v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that a sentence
enhancement which increased a defendant's potential term of
confinement in prison from two years to twenty years based solely
upon the defendant's prior convictions need not be submitted to
the jury. See 523 U.S. at 226-27. Almendarez-Torres was
reaffirmed in Apprendi and other courts have applied these cases
13. The validity of Rodriguez-Gonzales is in question. The
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, considered and rejected a similar
argument in 2002. See United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d
1201, 1208-11 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), overruled in part by
United States v. Rodriguez, 76 U.S.L.W. 4302 (2008) (holding that
"maximum penalty prescribed by law" as used in federal Armed
Career Criminal Act includes any time added under recidivist
enhancements). Notably, the en banc majority did so over the
dissent's objection that "[r]aising the level of crime from a
misdemeanor to a felony adds such grave consequences for the
individual charged with a crime that it seems wholly
inconceivable that the element which causes this escalation can
be deemed merely a sentencing factor." Id. at 1218-19 (Kozinski,
J., dissenting). Moreover, since the decision in RodriguezGonzales, the Ninth Circuit has held that the increase of a
defendant's sentence from twenty years in prison to "a mandatory
minimum sentence of life imprisonment based on [the trial
court's] finding that [defendant] had two prior" convictions was
a sentencing factor which did not need to be submitted to the
jury. United States v. McCanev, 177 F. App'x 704, 709-10 (9th*
Cir.), cert, denied, 127 S. Ct. 831 (2006).
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to instances where a defendant's term of confinement was enhanced
to a sentence of life in prison. See, e.g., United States v.
Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 696 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 186 n.16 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v.
Phipps, 259 F.3d 961, 962-63 (8th Cir. 2001). See generally
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35 (holding the "magnitude of
the increase in the maximum authorized sentence" "prove[d]
little" (emphasis omitted)). Thus, while the dissent correctly
notes that enhancing a defendant's sentence to a felony means the
defendant may "incur serious collateral effects such as
employment and deportation . . . as well as loss of voting and
gun possession privileges," see infra \ 31, we find these
"serious collateral effects" pale in comparison to the complete
loss of freedom--sometimes for life--approved by the Supreme
Court and applied by other jurisdictions. For example, in
addition to his confinement for twenty rather than two years, the
defendant in Almendarez-Torres could not vote, possess a gun, or
obtain gainful employment during the eighteen extra years he was
incarcerated. Accordingly, although we acknowledge the very real
consequences of elevating a charge from a misdemeanor to a
felony, we are unpersuaded that the consequences are greater than
those present in Almendarez-Torres.14
^22 Because subsection (6) (a) is a sentence enhancement based on
recidivism and not an element of the crime charged, Palmer did
not have a constitutional right to have his prior convictions
decided by a jury.15 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
476 (2000); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229-35; Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999). Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court's ruling on these grounds. See State v. Tueller,
2001 UT App 317, H 23, 37 P.3d 1180 ("It is a well-established
rule that we may affirm a judgment of the trial court on grounds
other than those used as the basis for its decision."). 16
14. Under the dissent's argument, the State would be incapable of
"enhancing" numerous crimes, as opposed to charging them as new
crimes with separate "elements," regardless of the number of
defendant's prior convictions. Under Utah law, even the most
severe misdemeanor is punishable by imprisonment "for a term not
exceeding one year." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204 (2003). Thus,
anytime the legislature determines the punishment for a repeat
offender should extend incarceration beyond one year, it must do
so by changing the level of the offense to a felony.
15. Proof of Palmer's previous convictions was submitted by
exhibit to the trial court and included in the record on appeal.
16.

Even if we agreed with the dissent that Palmer has a
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
^23 We conclude that subsection (6)(a) is a penalty provision
that simply increases the sentence for a recidivist. Because the
Sixth Amendment does not require recidivism to be submitted to
the jury when used merely as a sentence enhancement, we affirm
Palmer's felony sentence for driving under the influence.
H24

Affirmed.

Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

1|25

I CONCUR:

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
i[26 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this
case, which concludes that the legislature intended Utah Code
section 41-6-44(6) (a) to constitute a sentence enhancement used
to increase punishment for a recidivist rather than a separate
DUI offense element. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp.
2004). In particular, I disagree with the majority's treatment
of State v. Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284 (1953), and with
the majority's statutory interpretation of section 41-6-44.

16 . ( ...continued)
constitutional right to have his prior convictions submitted to
the jury, any violation of that right may very well be subject to
harmless-error analysis--an issue we need not address today. See
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 9-13 (1999) (applying
harmless error analysis, rather than structural error, where jury
was not instructed on one element of the offense); Washington v.
Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. 2546, 2551-53 (2006) ("Failure to submit a
sentencing factor to the jury, like failure to submit an element
to the jury, is not structural error.").
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1)27 Both the pertinent case law ruling in Harris that a prior
conviction is a material element for which the jury must
determine proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the text of the
statute--which does not unambiguously provide that prior
convictions are to be used merely as a sentencing enhancement,
support the conclusion that subsection (6)(a)--is a separate
offense that includes the violation described in subsection
(2)(a) and adds the additional element of "a third or subsequent
conviction under this section within ten years of two or more
prior convictions." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) .
^[28 To begin, I disagree with the majority's disregard of
Harris. The majority attempts to distinguish Harris from this
case by stating first that it is not applicable because it was
decided under Utah's Constitution, which Palmer has not cited.
Nonetheless, Harris is binding law that is directly on point. In
Harris, the supreme court interpreted and applied a similar
version of the relevant statute. The majority fails to
acknowledge that although Harris was decided forty-five years
ago, it has not been altered, distinguished, or reversed since
the Utah Supreme Court decided it.
1(29 Second, the majority dismisses Harris because the case was
decided before the United States Supreme Court decided
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), and
because section 41-6-44 has been amended more than forty times
since Harris was decided. However, Almendarez-Torres provides
little guidance as to whether the Utah State Legislature intended
subsection 41-6-44(6)(a) to be a separate element of the offense
or just a penalty enhancement. In Almendarez-Torres, the Supreme
Court merely held that Congress intended to set forth a
sentencing factor in United States Code subsection 1326(b)(2).
See 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2) (1988). Thus, it makes no difference
that Harris was decided prior to Almendarez-Torres.
i]3 0 Although the majority is correct in pointing out that Utah
Code section 41-6-44 has been amended over forty times since
Harris, the language and structure of the code is substantially
the same. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1953); see id. § 41-6-44
(Supp. 2004) . Both versions of the statute set forth the initial
elements of a DUI crime and then provide additional elements in
later subsections. See id. § 41-6-44(d) (1953) ("Every person
who is convicted of a violation of this section shall be punished
upon a first conviction by . . . , a second or subsequent
conviction, . . . shall be punished by . . . ." (emphasis
added)); id. § 41-6-44(6) (a) (2004) ("A conviction for a
violation of [s]ubsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within
ten years . . . ." (emphasis added)). Additionally, it is of no
real consequence that the majority suggests that recent decisions
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have referred to subsection (6)(a) as an enhancement provision.
Instead, it is key that Harris provides that prior convictions
are to be treated as an element and no other case has
contradicted that holding.
f31 Moreover, the plain language and structure of the statute
supports the Harris ruling that a prior conviction is a material
element for which the jury must determine proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, I disagree with the majority's focus on
the fact that recidivism is the relevant subject matter of the
statute, which the majority considers to be merely a typical
factor to be considered at sentencing. See supra ^ 12; see also
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230. Although recidivism may be
used as a sentencing factor, this categorization alone does not
make clear the meaning of the statute. Rather, the issue before
us is whether the legislature intended prior convictions under
subsection (6)(b), that not only increases punishment but alters
the degree of the charge, to be treated as a sentence enhancement
or an element of the offense. A statute that allows a defendant
to be charged and convicted without a jury trial on elements
which change the charge from a class B misdemeanor to a third
degree felony is disconcerting and reaches beyond mere punishment
enhancement to subject a defendant convicted of such a felony to
potentially incur serious collateral effects such as employment
and deportation issues as well as loss of voting and gun
possession privileges. 1
i[32 I am not persuaded by the majority's reading of the plain
language. The majority considers the plain language of
subsections (6)(a) and (2) in conjunction with one another and
determines that because subsection (6)(a) does not prohibit any
particular activity or provide additional elements to those
already articulated in subsection (2), that the language in
subsection (6)(a), "[a] conviction for a violation of
[s]ubsection (2)," is an express prerequisite to application of
subsection (6)(a), making subsection (6)(a) a sentencing
enhancement only.
^[33 Rather, I read subsection (6) (a) as providing an additional
element to those contained in subsection (2). Subsection (6)(a)
makes it clear that before a defendant may be charged and
convicted of a third degree felony DUI an additional element must
be established, i.e., "a third or subsequent conviction
. . . within ten years of two or more prior convictions." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6) (a) (2004). As such, Palmer should not be
convicted of third degree DUI without proof beyond a reasonable
1. Under federal law, a convicted felon may not possess a gun.
See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000).
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doubt that he had a third DUI conviction within ten years.
Moreover, a prior conviction ought to be considered as an element
because it is the only difference between a class B misdemeanor
and third degree felony DUI. Without such a reading, the two
charges would merge and a defendant who met all of the elements
for a class B misdemeanor could be charged and convicted for a
third degree felony with the presence or absence of a prior
conviction considered only at sentencing.
i[34 Finally, the structure of the statute supports the Harris
ruling and the plain language reading of the statute articulated
above. The majority also considers the structure of the statute
and notes that several DUI crimes described in subsection
(2) include within that section the element of prior convictions.
While the majority would conclude that because we assume that the
legislature's decision to include prior convictions within
subsection (2)(a)(iv) and (v), and not within subsection
(2)(a)(iii)--the section Palmer is being charged with--the
difference was deliberate, and the prior conviction articulated
in subsection (6)(a) is merely a sentencing enhancement. The
majority concludes that had the legislature wanted to include
prior conviction as an element to the violation articulated in
(2) (a) (iii) it would have done so within that subsection and not
in a later subsection. However, a closer look at the structure
of the statute reveals evidence that the legislature intended
prior convictions under subsection (6)(a) to be treated as an
element of the crime of third degree felony DUI.
i|3 5 The statute contains several sections which provide
additional elements in a structure similar to subsection (6)(a).
See id. §§ 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (A)-(C) , (3) (b) . For instance,
subsection (3)(a)(ii)(B) incorporates the additional element of
"ha[ving] a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense" into the violation articulated in subsection
(2) . Id. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (ii) (B) . Subsection (3) (a) (ii) (B),
which requires proof of "a passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense" has been treated as an
element regardless of its appearance in a subsection other than
(2). Id. This court held that
[biased upon the plain language of [section
41-6-44,] . . . . [t]o convict a defendant of
violating the part of the section 41-6-44
under which [the defendant] was charged, the
[s]tate is required to prove that the
defendant had a "blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater at the
time of operation or actual physical control"
of the vehicle and that the defendant "had a
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passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense."
State v. Hernandez, 2003 UT App 276, 1 12, 76 P.3d 198 (citation
omitted). Thus, by holding that prior convictions under
subsection (6)(a) are not considered additional elements because
they do not appear in subsection (2), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 4641-6-44 (2) (a) (iv)-(v), contradicts case law. Moreover, the
application of said reasoning would effectively make the
additional elements listed throughout the statute sentencing
factors. See id. § 41-6-44 (3) (a) (iii) (A)-(C) . The discord
between the statute's construction incorporating prior
convictions under subsection (2) for some DUI charges and
providing additional elements elsewhere in the statute for other
DUI charges may be due to the fact that subsections (2)(a)(iv)
and (v) were not original to the statute and were added in 2004.
See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2004) (amendment notes).
Based on the structure of the code as analyzed above it is my
belief that the legislature intended subsection (6)(a)fs prior
conviction language to be treated as an additional element and
not a sentencing enhancement.2
f36 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion.

William A. Thome Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

2. The majority asserts that this reading of the statute would
make the State "incapable of 'enhancing1 numerous crimes
regardless of the number of defendant's prior convictions" and
would require the legislature to change the level of offense to a
felony anytime it determines the punishment for a repeat offender
should extend incarceration beyond one year. Supra ^ 21 n.14.
This is not my position, nor would it be the result of treating
prior convictions as an element of a DUI offense. Instead, the
result of treating prior convictions as an element would be to
avoid perfunctorily enhancing numerous crimes which may have
serious collateral effects ar\d to ensure that any such
enhancements would be done thoughtfully and with due process.
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Addendum B

§41-6-43.8
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Library References
Criminal Law <B»272.
CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 365 to 374, 384 to
Westkw Key Number Search: 110k272.
391,400 to 407, 410, 418.
§ 41-6-43.10.

Repealed by Laws 1985, 1st Sp. Sess., c 1, § 2

§ 4 1 - 6 - 4 4 . Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination
of both or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentrationr—Measurement of blood or breath alcohol—Criminal punishment—Arrest without
warrant—Penalties—Suspension or revocation of license
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "assessment" means an in-depth clinical interview with a licensed
mental health therapist:
(i) used to determine if a person is in need ofi
(A) substance abuse treatment that is obtained at a substance abuse,
program;
(B) an educational series; or
(C) a combination of Subsections (l)(a)(i)(A) and (B); and
(ii) that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health
in accordance with Section 62A-15-105.
(b)(i) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation oE
(A) this section;
(B) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(C) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken illegally in the body?
(D) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43;
(E) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207;
(F) Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g);
(G) a violation described in Subsections (l)(b)(i)(A) through (F), which
judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or
(H) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States which
would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a
combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state,
including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(ii) A plea of guilty or no contest to a violation described in Subsections
(l)(b)(i)(A) through (H) which plea is held in abeyance under Title 77,
Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the equivalent of a conviction, even if the
544
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(B) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .05 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
operation or actual physical control; and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction; or
(v)(A) is 21 years of age or older;
(B) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .05 grams or
greater at the time of operation or actual physical control;
(C) has a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
operation or actual physical control; and
(D) committed the offense within ten years of a prior conviction.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been
legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of
violating this section,
(c) Alcohol concentration in the. blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3)(a) A person jagnvicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsections (2)(a)(i) through (iii) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result
of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of
the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of
age in the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner.
(c) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2)(a)(iv) or (v) is guilty
of:
(i) a class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) a class A misdemeanor if the person has also inflicted bodily injury
upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent maimer.
(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require
the person to:
546
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(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with
Subsection (14).
(6)(a) A conviction for'a violation of Subsectibn (2) is a third degree felony if
it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of
two or more prior convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed
after July 1,2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1,
2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of
this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of
a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive care
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after
treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the
court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which
may include requiring the person to participate in home confinement through
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any seitfence required under this section may
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person to: participate in a screening; an
assessment, if appropriate; and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion
of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse
treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening, assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection
with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or
41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection
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(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court
under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
(12)(a)(i) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days,
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those persons
who have shown they are safety hazards.(ii) The additional suspension or revocation period provided, in this
Subsection (12) shall^begin the date on which the individual would be
eligible to reinstate the individual's driving privilege for a violation of
Subsection (2).
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division
an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified
period of time.
(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert
the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement
units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the
person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may be
monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other
specified location.
(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a
substance abuse testing instrument;
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the
time the person is subject to home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to
attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel directly
between those activities and the person's home; and
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Historical and Statutory Notes
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2002, c
8, § 1, Laws 2002, c. 54, § 1 and Laws 2002, c.
106, § 1.
Laws 2002, c,, 8; Laws 2002, c. 54; and,
Laws 2002, c. 106, Laws 2002, 5th Sp. Sess. c . '
3; collectively rewrote this section that formerly
provided:
"(1) As used in this section:
"(a) 'educational series' means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse program
that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
"(b) 'prior conviction' means any conviction
for a violation of:
"(i) this section;
"(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under
Subsections (9) and (10);
"(iii) local ordinances similar.to this section
or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in
compliance with Section 41-6-43;
"(iv) automobile homicide under Section
76-5-207; or
"(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any
other state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
"(c) 'screening and assessment' means a substance abuse addiction and dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of
Substance Abuse in accordance with Section
62A-8-107;
"(d) 'serious bodily injury' means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death;
"(e) 'substance abuse treatment' means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program

that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107;
"(f) 'substance abuse treatment program'
means a state licensed substance abuse program;
"(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Section
41-6-43; and
"(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person exercises under like or similar
circumstances.
"(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person:
"(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a
chemical test given within two hours of the
alleged operation or physical control shows that
the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater; or
"(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.^
"(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against
any charge of violating this section.
"(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the
breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per
210 liters of breath.
"(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second
time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of
a:
"(i) class B misdemeanor; or
"(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
"(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner;
"(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or

552

§ 41-6-44

TKAFFIC RULES & REGULATIONS
"(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle
at the time of the offense.
"(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if
the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner.
"(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours.
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or
part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work
program for not less than 24 hours; or
"(ii) participate in home
confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the court shall:
"(i) order the person to participate in a
screening and assessment;
"(ii) order the person to participate in an
educational series if the court does not order
substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (4)(d); and
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
"(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate.
"(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection
(4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the
person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction
under this section, the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 240 consecutive hours.
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or
part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work
program for not less than 240 hours; or
"(ii) participate in home
confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the court shall:
"(0 order the person to participate in a
screening and assessment;
"(ii) order the person to participate in an
educational series if the court does not order

substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (5)(d); and
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
"(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate.
"(e) The court shall order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is committed:
"(i) within ten years of two or more prior
convictions under this section; or
"(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
"(A) automobile homicide under Section
76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001;
or
"(B) a felony violation under this section that
is committed after July 1, 2001.
"(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the
court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the
court shall impose:
"(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
"(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 1,500 hours.
"(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or(b), the court
shall impose an order requiring the person to
obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse
treatment program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after treatment for not less
than 240 hours.
"(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the court may require the
person to participate in home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
"(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence
required under this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for
parole or probation until any sentence imposed
under this section has been served Probation or
parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this section may not be terminated.
"(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4),
(5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to
order a convicted person to: participate in a
screening and assessment; and an educational
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court,
substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under
Subsection (9).
"(ii) The court shall render the same order
regarding screening and assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in
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connection with a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9), as the court would render
in connection with applying respectively, the
first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
"(b) If a person fails to complete all court
ordered screening and assessment, educational
series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails
to pay all fines and fees, including fees for
restitution and treatment costs, the court shall
notify the Driver License Division of a failure to
comply. Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege
in accordance
with
Subsections
53-3-221(2) and (3).
"(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance
enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including
whether or not there had been consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the violation.
"(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the
facts that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both,
by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
"(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation
of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
"(c) The court shall notify the Driver License
Division of each conviction of Section
41-6—44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
"(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe
the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the violation was committed by
the person.
"(1 l)(a) The Driver License Division shall:
"(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license
of a person convicted for the first time under
Subsection (2);
"(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under
Subsection (2) if the violation is committed
within a period of ten years from the date of the
prior violation; and
"(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection
(12).
"(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period
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the number of days for which a license was
previously suspended under Section 53-3-223
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was
based on the same occurrence upon which the
record of conviction is based.
"(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties
provided in this section, a court may order the
operators license of a person who is convicted
of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended
or revoked for an additional period of 90 days,
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from
the highways those persons who have shown
they are safety hazards.
"(b) If the court suspends or revokes the persons license under this Subsection (12)(b), the
court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke
that person's driving privileges for a specified
period of time.
"(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring
shall alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units,
or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
"(b) The electronic monitoringdevice shall be
used under conditions which require:
"(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
"(ii) that a device be placed in, the home or
other specified location of the person, so that
the person's compliance with the court's order
may be monitored; and
"(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
"(c) The court shall order the appropriate
entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place
an electronic monitoring device on the person
and install electronic monitoring equipment in
the residence of the person or other specified
location.
"(d) The court may:
"(i) require the person's electronic home
monitoring device to include a substance abuse
testing instrument;
"(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person
may consume during the time the person is
subject to home confinement;
"(iii) set specific time and location conditions
that allow the person to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel
directly between those activities and the person's home; and
"(IV) waive all or part of the costs associated
with home confinement if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
"(e) The electronic monitoring described in
this section may either be administered directly
by the appropriate corrections agency, proba-
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tion monitoring agency, or by contract with a
private provider.
"(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall
cover the costs of waivers by the court under
Subsection (13)(c)(iv).
"(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered
under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or
(5)(e):
"(i) the court shall specify the period of the
probation;
"(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of
the probation; a n d
"(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
"(b) The court shall provide the probation
described in this section by contract with a
probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
"(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court orders
received under this article and shall notify the
court of any failure to comply with or complete
that sentence or those conditions or orders.
"(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the
costs associated with probation if the person is
determined to be indigent by the c o u r t
"(ii) The probation provider described in
Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
"(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence
that the person h a d a blood alcohol level of .16
or higher, then if the court does not order:
"(a) treatment as described under Subsection
(4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(b)(iii), then the court shall
enter the reasons on the record; and
"(b) the following penalties, the court shall
enter the reasons on the record:
"(i) the installation of an ignition interlock
system as a condition of probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
"(ii) the imposition of home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13)."
Laws 2004, c. 161; Laws 2004, c. 205; and
Laws 2004, c. 228, collectively rewrote this section, which formerly provided:
"(1) As used in this section:
"(a) 'conviction' means any conviction for a
violation of:
"(0 this section;
"(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of
both-related reckless driving under Subsections
(9) and (10);
"(m) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any
measurable controlled substance that is taken
illegally in the body;
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"(iv) local ordinances similar to this section
or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of bothrelated reckless driving adopted in compliance
with Section 4 1 - 6 - 4 3 ;
"(v) automobile homicide under Section
76-5-207; or
"(vi) a violation described in Subsections
(l)(a)(i) through (v), which judgment of conviction is reduced u n d e r Section 76-3-402; or
"(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any
other state, the United States, or any district,
possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of
both-related reckless driving if committed in
this state, including punishments administered
under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
"(b) 'educational series' means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse program
that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with
Section 62A-15-105;
"(c) 'screening and assessment' means a substance abuse addiction and dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance
abuse program that is approved by the Board of
Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
"(d) 'serious bodily injury' means "bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member or organ, or
creates a substantial risk of death;
"(e) 'substance abuse treatment' means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program
that is approved by the Board of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with
Section 62A-15-105;
"(f) 'substance abuse treatment program'
means a state licensed substance abuse program;
"(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Section
4 1 - 6 - 4 3 ; and
"(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person exercises under like or similar
circumstances.
"(2)(a) A person may not operate or be in
actual physical control of a vehicle within this
state if the person:
"(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a
subsequent chemical test shows that the person
has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
"(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and
any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
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"(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.
"(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against
any charge of violating this section.
"(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the
breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per
210 liters of breath.
"(3)(a) A person convicted the first or second
time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of
a:
"(i) class B misdemeanor; or
"(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
"(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner,
"(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or
"(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle
at the time of the offense.
"(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if
the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner.
"(4)(a) As part of any sentence imposed the
court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48
consecutive hours.
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or
part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work
program for not less than 48 hours; or
"(ii) participate in home
confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the court shall:
"(i) order the person to participate in a
screening and assessment;
"(ii) order the person to participate in an
educational series if the court does not order
substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (4)(d); and
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
"(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance
abuse treatment program detennines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate.
"(e)(i) Except as provided in Subsection
(4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the
person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or high-
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er, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(5)(a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction
under this section, the court shall as part of any
sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 240 consecutive hours.
"(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or
part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
"(i) work in a compensatory-service work
program for not less than 240 hours; or
"(ii) participate in home
confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
"(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the court shall:
"(i) order the person to participate in a
screening and assessment;
"(ii) order the person to participate in an
educational series if the court does not order
substance abuse treatment as described under
Subsection (5)(d); and
"(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
"(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate.
"(e) The court shall order probation for the
person in accordance with Subsection (14).
"(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is:
"(i) a third or subsequent conviction under
this section within ten years of two or more
prior convictions; or
"(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
"(A) automobile homicide under Section
76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001;
or
"(B) a felony violation under this section that
is committed after July 1, 2001.
"(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction
for purposes of this section.
"(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the
court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the
court shall impose:
"(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
"(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 1,500 hours.
"(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court
shall impose an order requiring the person to
obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse
treatment program providing intensive care or
inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after treatment for not less
than 240 hours.
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"(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the person to
participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with
Subsection (13).
"(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence
required under this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for
parole or probation until any sentence imposed
under this section has been served. Probation
or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this section may not be terminated.
"(8)(a)(i) The provisions in Subsections (4),
(5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to
order a convicted person to: participate in a
screening and assessment; and an educational
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court,
substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under
Subsection (9).
"(ii) The court shall render the same order
regarding screening and assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9), as the court would render
in connection with applying respectively, the
first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
"(b) The court shall notify the Driver License
Division if a person fails to:
"(i) complete all court ordered:
"(A) screening and assessment;
"(B) educational series;
"(C) substance abuse treatment; and
"(D) hours of work in compensatory-service
work program; or
"(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for
restitution and treatment costs. Upon receiving
the notification, the division shall suspend the
person's driving privilege in accordance with
Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3).
"(9)(a)(i) When the prosecution agrees to a
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance
enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute
for, an original charge of a violation of this
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including
whether or not there had been consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the violation.
"(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the
facts that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both,
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by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
"(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation
of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
"(c) The court shall notify the Driver License
Division of each conviction of Section
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
"(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe
the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause
to believe that the violation was committed by
the person.
"(ll)(a) The Driver License Division shall:
"(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license
of a person convicted for the first time under
Subsection (2);
"(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under
Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior
conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the
violation is committed within a period of ten
years from the date of the prior violation; and
"(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection
(12).
"(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period
the number of days for which a license was
previously suspended under Section 53-3-223
or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was
based on the same occurrence upon which the
record of conviction is based.
"(12)(a) In addition to any other penalties
provided in this section, a court may order the
operator's license of a person who is convicted
of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended
or revoked for an additional period of 90 days,
180 days, one year, or two years to remove from
the highways those persons who have shown
they are safety hazards.
"(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the
court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke
that person's driving privileges for a specified
period of time.
"(13)(a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring
shall alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units,
or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
"(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be
used under conditions which require:
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"(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
"(ii) that a device be placed in the home or
other specified location of the person, so that
the person's compliance with the court's order
may be monitored; and
"(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
"(c) The court shall order the appropriate
entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place
an electronic monitoring device on the person
and install electronic monitoring equipment in
the residence of the person or other specified
location.
"(d) Hie court may:
"(i) require the person's electronic home
monitoring device to include a substance abuse
testing instrument;
"(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person
may consume during the time the person is
subject to home confinement;
"(iii) set specific time and location conditions
that allow the person to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel
directly between those activities and the person's home; and
"(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated
with home confinement if the person is determined to be indigent by the court.
"(e) The electronic monitoring described in
this section may either be administered directly
by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a
private provider.
"(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall
cover the costs of waivers by the court under
Subsection (13)(c)(iv).
"(14)(a) If supervised probation is ordered
under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or
(5)(e):

"(i) the court shall specify the period of the
probation;
"(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of
the probation; and
"(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
"(b) The court shall provide the probation
described in this section by contract with a
probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
"(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court orders
received under this article and shall notify the
court of any failure to comply with or complete
that sentence or those conditions or orders.
"(d)(i) The court may waive all or part of the
costs associated with probation if the person is
determined to be indigent by the court.
"(ii) The probation provider described in
Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i).
"(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of
Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence
that the person had a blood alcohol level of 16
or higher, then if the court does not order
"(a) treatment as described under Subsection
(4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then the court shall enter
the reasons on the record; and
"(b) the following penalties, the court shall
enter the reasons on the record:
"(i) the installation of an ignition interlock
system as a condition of probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
"(ii) the imposition of home confinement
through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13)."
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2004, c.
161 § 1, Laws 2004, c. 205, § 1 and Laws 2004,
c. 228, § 3.

Cross References
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Chemical test for driving under the influence, see § 53-3-223.
Conditional license, see § 53-3-232.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76—4-201 et seq.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Homicide involving automobile, see § 76-5-207.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302.
Juveniles, jurisdiction of juvenile court, original and exclusive, see § 78-3a-104.
Mandatory revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of license, see § 53-3-220.
Military courts, intoxicated or reckless driving, see § 39-6-93.
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203.
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204.
Penalty for DUI conviction, amounts, see § 62A-l5-502.
Restrictions on pleas to DUI, education or treatment incentive program defined, see § 77-2a-3.L
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10.
Search warrants, criminal procedure, see § 77-23-201 et seq.
Unreasonable searches prohibited, see Const. Art. 1, § 14.
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in an accident shall also file with the designated city department a report
of such accident or a copy of any report herein required to be filed with
the department. All such reports shall be for the confidential use of the
city department and subject to the provisions of section 41-6-40.
History: L. 1941, chu 52, §32; 0. 1943,
57-7-109.
Compiler's Note.
The reference in this section to "section
41-6-40" appeared in the act as "section
30."

Collateral Beferences.
Automobiles@=>10.
60 C J 8 Motor VeMcles
' ' §43*

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING
Section 41-6-43. Powers of local authorities.
41-6-44. Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drug—Habitual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content
in blood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license.
41-6-45. Reckless driving—Penalty.

41-6-43* Powers of local authorities.—(a) Local authorities lhay by
ordinance provide that it shall be unlawful for any person who is an
habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence
of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive or be in actual physical
control of any vehicle, and provide penalties therefor as a first offense
consistent with section 41-6-44.
(b) Local authorities may also by ordinance provide that any person
who drives any vehicle in wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property is guilty df reckless driving, and" provide penalties
therefor as a first offense consistent with section 41-6-45.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, §33; C. 1943,
57-7-110.
Compiler's Note.
The references in this section to "section
41-6-44" and "section 41-6-45" appeared
in the act as "section 34 of this act" and
"section 35 of this act" respectively.
Comparable Provision.
Uniform Act, § 18 (unlawful for habitual user of narcotic drugs or one under
influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs to drive vehicle on highway);
§ 19 (unlawful to drive vehicle carelessly
and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of rights or safety of others, or
without due caution and at speed or in
manner so as to endanger any person or
property; constitutes reckless driving).

Cross-Reference.
Powers and duties of cities and towns
generaUy, 10-8-1 et seq.
1. Powers of cities,
City held to have power to pass ordinance prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwithstanding statute on the subject. Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U.
113, 93 P. 2d 671. (Moffat, C. J., and
Larson, J., dissenting.)
Collateral Beferences.
Automobiles<§=>332.
61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628.
Driving while intoxicated, 5 Am. Jur»
916, Automobiles § 766 et seq.
Constitutionality .of legislative delegation of powers to prescribe or vary regnlations concerning motor vehicles used on
highways, 87 A. L. E. 546.

41-6-44. Driving while under influence of intoxicating liquor or drugHabitual user of narcotics—Presumptions arising from alcoholic content in
Wood—Criminal punishment—Revocation of license.—(a) It is unlawful
178

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

4 1 _6_ 4 4

and punishable as provided in subdivision (d) of thi* * ••
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